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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Western Leasing filed an action against Defendants in the Third
1ud1c1al District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah, seeking a deficiency
judqment after the sale of repossessed equipment.

Vernon R. Erickson was a

quarantor of two leases/security agreements of BMG Corporation.

Vernon R.

Erickson presented evidence at the trial court and argued that the sale of
the repossessed equipment was not commercially reasonable and that the notice
of sale was defective.

Western Leasing claimed it was entitled to a

deficiency judgment since efforts were made to make the sale commercially
reasonable and that their demand letter satisfied the notice requirements.
nISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable David B. nee
presiding, granted judgment in favor of Western Leasing.

The trial court

held that the sale was commercialy reasonable and that the notice given was
sufficient notice as required by statute.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Vernon R. Erickson, Appellant, seeks to have this Court reverse
the lower court's decision and set aside the judgment entered against him on
December 20, 1982.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
In 1979, Western Leasing, Respondent, entered into two lease/
security agreements with BMG Corporation (R. 70 & 101, Plaintiff's Exhibits

& 2).

One lease/security agreement was for a shear and the other was for

•lathe (R. 70 & 101, Plaintiff's Exhibits l & 2) (The shear and lathe will
hereinafter be referred to as "Equipment").

Appellant, Bruce V. Erickson

and Michael R. Erickson, executed the lease/security aqrPe11ents .is ouarantors
in their personal capacity (R. 71 & 102, Plaintiff's Exhibits
R. Erickson is the father of Bruce V. Erickson anrl
101-102).

R.

The sons were the principals of BMG Corporation,

obliger (R. 101-102).

(R.
corporate

The guarantors, by the tenns of the lease/security

agreements, agreed to be jointly and severally liable for the corporate
obligation (R. 7l & 102).
Western Leasing claimed that the leases were in default in the
summer of 1979 (R. 100-105).

On April 21, 1980, Western Leasinq sent a

demand letter to Vernon R. Erickson.

The demand letter stated:

If a payment is not received in our office before April
30, 1980, we will be forced to sell the equipment as
quickly as possible for whatever we can get and ask you
to make up any dificiencies [sic] on the balance of the
leases. (R. 104, Plaintiff's Exhibit 3).
Western Leasing gained peaceable possession of the equipment
by the lease/security agreements on September 5, 1980 (R. 29, 114-115).

At

that time Western Leasing published an advertisement to sell the equipment
(R. 71, 114 & Plaintiff's Exhibit 5).

On September ll, 1980, counsel for

Western Leasing sent a demand letter to Vernon R. Erickson (R. 71, 108-109

& Plaintiff's Exhibit 4).

Included within this letter, counsel stated that

"The equipment covered ••. will be sold on September 30, 1980, unless the
amounts due ... have been paid."

(Id.)

The equipment covered under the lease/security agreements, was not
sold on September 30, 1980 as stated in Western Leasing's demanrl letter (Q.
30, 72 & Plaintiff's Exhibit 4).

The equipf'lent ha i only been
1

to

minimal use and was in excellent condition at the time of sale (Q. 120-121,
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lh?-168 & Plaintiff's Exhibit 5).

The useful life of this equipment by

'kstPrn Leasing's own admission is thirty years (R. 37).

Western Leasing

had purchased the shear new for $33,000 in the spring of 1979, and the lathe
new for $18,000 in the summer of 1979 (R. 32).

A written appraisal by an

independent, qualified appraiser was not obtained by Western Leasing (R. 32,
127).
71).

They accepted non-competitive bids from interested purchasers (R. 30,
The shear was sold on October 9, 1980 for $19,000, and the lathe on

October 1, 1980 for $6,000 (R. 30, 72).

The only independent evidence

presented at trial as to the value of the equipment at the time of sale was
that the equipment would have a minimum fair market value of at least 80% of
the purchase price (R. 193-199).

The letter alleged to be

notice of sale

did not give notice of the time, place, manner, method and date of the sale
of the equipment to Appellant (R. 31).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
WESTERN LEASING'S SALE OF THE EQUIPMENT
WAS NOT COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE
Appellant contends that the sale of the equipment covered by the
leases/security agreements was not performed in a commercially reasonable
manner.

This point will demonstate: (A) Every aspect of a private sale must

be commercially reasonable; (B) The method and manner of Western Leasing's
sale were not commercially reasonable; and (C) The timing of Western Leasing's
sale of the equipment was not commercially reasonable.
A.

The U.C.C. Requires that Every Aspect of a Private
Sale Must be Commercially Reasonable.

Utah has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) with minor
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modifications.

Under lltah Code Ann. §7rJA-q-5n4(19S3), which is

to

U.C.C. §9-504 (1972), a sernred party may sell collateral hv either puhlic
private sale or other disposition.

0,

All dispositions, however, whethPr public

or private, are subject to the standard of co1nmercial reasonableness.

Under

pre-Code law, the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, a public sale was mandate1.
The drafters of the U.C.C., recognizing the harshness of public sales upon
debtors and guarantors, chose to follow the more liberal position of the
former Uniform Trust Receipts Act which permitted disposition at either public
sale or private sale, thereby rejecting the provisions of the former Uniform
Conditional Sales Act.

By adopting this more liberal position, the drafters

stated:
It is hoped that private sale will be encouraged where,
as is frequently the case, private sale through
commercial channels will result in higher realization
on collateral for the benefit of all parties. 11.C.C.
§9-504(1972), Official Comment l.
In adopting this more liberal position, the only restrictions
on the sale of collateral by the drafters of the U.C.C. are those of
commercial reasonableness and reasonable notification.

The commercial reason-

ableness standard parallels the requirement of the article on sales which also
reiterates the U.C.C. requirement of good faith in dispositions of property.
See U.C.C. §2-706(1972); Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-706(1953).

Thus, commercial

reasonableness and reasonable notification are the only protections afforded
the debtor to prevent abuses by the secured party in the resale of repossessed
collateral.
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The standard of commercial reasonableness stated in Utah Code Ann.
,111A-0-504(3)(1953) requires that "every aspect of the disposition includinq
the

method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable."

u.c.c.

§9-504(3)(1972).

§?OA-2-706(2)(1953).

Accord U.C.C. §2-706(2)(1972); Utah Code Ann.

The Code has also set forth tests as to what is

commercial reasonableness.
§9-507(2)(1972).

Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-507(2)(1953); U.C.C.

The standard of commercial reasonableness was to be flexible

so as to be molded to the facts, circumstances and the industry peculiarities
of each specific case.

The basic underlying policy, however, was to encourage

sales which would result in the highest realization possible upon sale of
the collateral.

This conclusion concerning UCC policy was also reached by

the Oregon Supreme Court in Weiss v. Northwest Acceptance Corp., 274 Or. 343,
546 P.2d 1065, 19 U.C.C.Rep. 348 (1976), which stated:
The purpose of the statute is fairly evident from its
language and the commentaries of the drafters. Grant
Gilmore, one of the drafters, wrote:
"[T]he Code secured party, like his pre-Code
·ounterparts, must 'use every effort to sell the
PState [collateral] under every possible
advantage of time, place and publicity.'
" ••. The obligation on the secured party is to
use his best efforts to see that the highest
possible price is received for the collateral."
2 Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal
Property, 1233-1234 (1965).
Id. 546 P.2d at 1072, 19 U.C.C.Rep. at 350.
The drafters perceived this policy as being best achieved by permitting and
encouraging private sales.

Consequently, commercial reasonableness requires
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good faith on the part of the securerl party to use ''very eftort tn se' I

the

collateral under every possillle advanLiqe nf tirne, place, '"etlio<I and 1'1nn11er
in order to obtain the highest realization possihle.
B.

The Method and Manner of l·lestern Leasing's
Sale Were NOT Commercially Reasonable.

The facts of this case demonstrate that liestern Leasing 'was unaware
of the rnarket value of the collateral sold.
nnt obtained.

An independent appraisal was

Western Leasinq contends that a hid for purchase by a dealer

i•rlicates the fair market value of the equiprnent.
not supported by the law.

Respondent's position is

I9.:._ Liberty National Bank v.

Tool Division, 54r

F.Zd 1375, 19 U.C.C.Rep. 1288 (10th Cir., 1976) (Failure to use professionals
in resale of equipment, contrary to trade practices, rendered sale comrnercially unreasonable.)

Western Leasing's argument is clearly erroneous since

an interested purchaser cannot be considered a neutral independent appraiser
of the rnarket value of equipment.
Western Leasing obtained several bids frorn prospective purchasers.
However, those individuals had been notified that the property had been
repossessed and that it was available for sale or assurnption of the leases.
E.g. Plaintiff's Exhibit 5.
a distress sale.

As a result, the potential buyers knew this was

Consequently, potential bidders conclu·.led that a bid less

than fair rnarket value would be entertained by the lessor.

Cornrnon knowledqe

dictates that one rarely makes a hid on equiprnent beinq sold in a distress
sale which closely approxirnates the equipment's actual fair market value
unless the bidding is cornpetitive.
The drafter's cornrnents state that a private sale nust 11se reqular
cornrnercial channels:
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The failure to prescribe a statutory period during
which disposition must he made is in line with the
policy adopted in this article to encourage disposition
by private sale throuqh regular commercial channels."
IJCC §9-504(1972), Official Comment 6 (emphasis added).
In refining the definition of commercial reasonableness, the Code specifies
three circumstances in which a sale would be commercially reasonable: (l)
Collateral sold "in the usual manner in any recognized market therefore;"
(2) Collateral sold "at the price current in [the recognized market] at the
time of sale;" and (3) Collateral sold "in conformity with reasonable
commercial practices among dealers in the type of property sold."

Utah Code

Ann. §70A-9-507(2)(1953); U.C.C. §9-507(2)(1972).
The first two alternatives presented by the Code inherently require
that a "recognized market" for the collateral exists.

Investment securities

have recogn.ized markets, i.e., the New York Stock Exchange and the American
Stock Exchange.

No "recognized market" exists for industrial equipment of

the type involved in this proceeding.

Indeed, many courts have even determined

that there is no recognized market for used

Community

Management Ass'n. v. Tousely, 32 Colo.App. 33, 505 P.2d 1314, 11 U.C.C.Rep.
1101 (1973).

Consequently, only the third alternative remains viable as

applicable to the facts of this case.
The third alternative of the Code is that the collateral be "sold
in conformity •fiith reasonable commercial practices a1nong dealers in the type
of property sold ••• " IJtah Code Ann. §70A-9-507(2) (1953), IJ.C.C. §9-507(2)
(1972).

The testiinony of '1Jestern Leasing at trial was that in normal

circu1nstances lessors sel 1 repossessed equipment through an equipment dealer

(q. at 119).

Yet, Western Leasing did not sell this equipment through a
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dealer.

The collateral in this case was not sold through norrnal, requLir

and reasonable commercial channels and a commercially reasonahle pricP was
not obtained.

Therefore, the sale was not cornmercial ly reasonable.

Equipment sold in normal, reqular and commercial channels is not
sold in a distress-type situation.

Prospective purchasers are unaware that

the equipment has been repossessed.
appraised value.

The equipment is listed for sale at its

The seller does not indicate that immediate disposition of

the equipment is required due to its repossession.

It necessarily follows

that Western Leasing's resale of the collateral was not a private sale as
envisioned and encouraged by the drafters of the Code.
Western Leasing's sale was open to the public.
advertised.

Bids were obtained.

The equipment was

However, the bidding was not competitive.

A public sale must involve competitive bidding.

Contois Motor Co. v. Saltz,

198 Neb. 455, 253 N.W.2d 290, 21 U.C.C.Rep. 1213 (1977) (A sale upon sealed
bids which were not competitive was held not to be a public sale). Therefore,
Western Leasing also failed to meet the requirements for a public sale.

Under

the circumstances of Western Leasing's sale, it is not difficult to perceive
that had the parties who submitted bids on the collateral been involved in
competitive bidding, the price realized would have approximated the fair
market value of eighty percent (30%) of the purchase price.
Having failed to sell the equipment through normal, regular and
reasonable commercial channels (i.e., a dealer) and failing to obtain a
commercially reasonable price, Western Leasing's sale of the collateral was
not a private sale envisioned by the Code.

Therefore, Western Leasing's sale

of the collateral was not commercially reasonable.
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C.

The Timing of Western Leasing's Sale Was
NOT Commercially Reasonable.

The standard of commercial reasonableness requires that every aspect
of the disposition, including time, must be commercially reasonable.
Code Ann. §70A-9-504(3)(1953); U.C.C. §9-504(3)(1972).

Utah

The terms of the

Western Leasing lease/security agreement fixed the amount of damages to be
paid in the event of default and repossession.

The damages under the default

provision and as calculated by Western Leasing in the lower court are the
contract payments accrued to the time of repossession, plus all future contract
payments under the contract which would have been paid, minus a minimal
deduction as a "pre-payment credit", plus a 10% reversionary value, minus
the amount realized on the resale of the collateral.
for "pre-payment credit" is nearly negligible.
(.2%).

However, the deduction

A mere 2/lOths of one percent

(In other words a reduction of the product of .002 multiplied by all

future rent yet to beco:ne due under the lease.)
and 2, 1121.

See, also, R. at 96).

(See Plaintiff's Exhibits l

Under the "pre-payment credit" provision,

the maximum amount which could be received for this credit on both leases
could never exceed $170.14 (which would be the pre-payment credit if the loan
defaulted immediately after the initial payment and signing of the lease/
security agreements).

Compared with the total rent of $95,897.88 to be paid

under the l ease/security agreements, this "pre-payment credit" is i nconsequent i al.
As a result of the liquidated damages provisions of these lease/
security agreements, the da01ages to be paid in the event of default were fixed
at the time of repossession of the equipment.
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The value of the liquidated

damages fixed at the time of repossession coulrl •inly be reduced hv
proceeds from the sale of the col lateral.

thP

It therefore fol lows thot

net

thP

greater the realization on the sale of the equipment, the less the r1Pf1n,,ncy
to be paid by the obligors and guarantors on the lease and vice versa.
Accordingly, Western Leasing coulrl have waited until they received a
commercialy reasonable price or even until the end of the term of the lease
(1984) to sell the equipment with the same damages

assesserl.

The

damages after waiting for a commercially reasonable price which would have
been assessed against the Appellant would have been the same, with the only
difference being the amount realized upon sale of the collateral.

By .iaitinq

to sell the equipment until a commercially reasonable price coulrl be obtained
or until the end of the lease term would have been commercially reasonable,
especially in light of expert testimony which indicated that this type of
equipment appreciated over time due to inflation.

Western Leasing had nothin9

to lose by waiting an additional period of time to sell the equipment and
obtain a commercially reasonable price.

All parties would benefit from a

higher realization from the collateral sold, which could have heen obtained
by selling at a more advantageous time.
Western Leasing's letter to Appellant stated that unless the
default was remedied "we will be forced to sell the equip1nent as quickly as
possible for whatever we can get and ask you to make up any dificiencies
(sic) ••• "

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 3) (Emphasis add<>d).

\·iestern Leasing's letter

set forth its intent and exemplifies Western Leasing's lack nf concern for
the amount to be received upon sale of the collateral.
sale was conducted in a manner consistent with its lett<>r.
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Leasinq's
The sille "'as n•l'

ly

because

Leasing sold the equipment as quickly

possible and for whatever they could obtain without waiting until they
'0uld obtain a commercially reasonable price.
POINT ! I
WESTERN LEASING'S LETTER rs NOT A NOTICE OF SALE
AND DOES NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMMERCIAL
CODE.
Western Leasing's letter does not meet the requirements of the
Commercial Code.

This point will demonstrate:

(A) The letter failed to

comply with the statutory notice requirements; and {R) The alleged letter of
notice was in effect a demand letter and not a notice of sale.
A.

The Letter Failed to Comply with the Statutory
Notice Requirements.

The provision construed in the lower court as notice of sale
pro ides "[t]he equipment covered by the lease is now in the possession of
flestern Leasing and will be sold ON September 30, 1980, unless ... " Plaintiff's
Exhibit 4 (emphasis added).

The pertinent provision of the Code states

"reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale ••• is to be
made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor ••• " Utah Code Ann.
§70A-9-504{3)(1953); U.C.C. §9-504(3)(1972) (emphasis added).

Western Leasing's

notice stated that the equipment would be sold ON September 30, 1980.

The

record reveals that the equipment was not sold on September 30, 1980 but was
sold after that date.

Western Leasing has argued that this notice was

sufficient to meet the private sale notice requirements of the Code.
the exact language of the Code requires that
the tirie

a private sale will be conducted.

However,

notice be qiven of
Western Leasing

rlid not indicate that the sale would be a private sale and did not state the
-11 -

time after which such a sale would occur.

Therefore, Western Leasinq rlid

not satisfy the statutory requ i rel'lent s.
Utah's most recent decision concerning the commercial reasonahlPness of a sale under Article 9, is Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc. v. Glaubensklee,
649 P.2d 28, 33 U.C.C.Rep. 1588 (Utah, 1982).

That case involved the

commercial reasonableness of a public sale under Article 9 and the notice
required for a public sale.

The appellant there argued that the notice which

had been given of the sale was confusing and did not specify whether the sale
would be a public sale or a private sale as outlined by the Code.

The Court

decided that issue by stating that the appellant could not claim any benefit
of the error in the notice of sale since the appellant could not show that
she had been prejudiced by the erroneous notice.

This case is distinguishable

from the Pioneer Dodge Center case inasmuch as Western Leasing has alleged the
sale to be a private sale and Vernon R. Erickson has shown that he was pre·udiced by the erroneous notice.

Consequently, this case is one of first

impression for this Court, since other decisions of this Court have also
focused upon public sales under Article 9 and not the definition, components
and requirements of private sales under Article 9.
Decisions of other jurisdictions have considered the requirements
of private sales.

The Ohio Court of Appeals, in Liberty National Rank of

Fremont v. Greiner, 62 Ohio App.2d 125, 405 N.E.Zd 317, 29 U.C.C.Rep. 718
(1978), held that a notice similar to the one given by Western Leasing was
inherently misleading and theref0re did not constitute proper notice of a
private sale pursuant to 1!.C.C. §9-504(3)(1972).

The secured party obtained

written bids on the sale of four repossessed trucks.
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The creditors notice

stated "[y]ou are hereby given notice that the property ••. will be sold on the
]11th day after receipt of this letter at Fremont, Ohio, and the minimum price
for which the secured property may be sold is $4,000."
l2n, 29 U.C.C.Rep. at 721.

Id. 405 N.E.2d at

The Court stated that the notice also provided a

description of the property, informed the obligor that he would be liable for
any deficiency and said that the sale was open to the public.

The Court

found that the creditor's notice had elements of both notice of a public sale
as well as notice of a private sale.

The Court held that "the notice was

patently ambiguous as to what type of sale would be held."
at 321, 29 U.C.C.Rep. at 722.

Id. 405 N.E.2d

The Court concluded by noting that:

[T]he combination of the form notice for private sale
with the language indicating a public sale would be held
is inherently misleading and, as such, does not constitute
proper notice of a private sale, pursuant to [U.C.C. §9-504(3)
(1972)]. (citation omitted) Id. 405 N.E.2d at 321, 29
U.C.C.Rep. at 723.
Similarly, the notice which Western Leasinq qave was inherently
misleading.

The notice stated that the equipment would be

30th, a specific date.

September

Indication of a specific date leads one to believe

that a public sale would be held.
after September 30, 1980.

However, the equipment was not sold until

The time or place of sale was not indicated.

would lead one to believe that the sale was private.

This

Therefore, Western

Leasing's notice was not reasonable notice of a private sale due to its
ambiguity.
In a recent decision from the Oregon Court of Appeals, Benton-Lincoln
Credit Service, Inc. v. Giffin, 48 Or.App. 559, 617 P.2d 662, 30 U.C.C.Rep.
396 (1980), it was held that a notice of sale under the Uniform Commercial
Code requires that the obligor be infonned how a sale is to be accomplished
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or the type or method by which a sale is to be effectuated.

The creditor in

that action contended that since the notice did not state thdt a aubl ic sale
at a given time and place was to be performed, then it should he presumed
that the sale would be a private one.
as too presumptive.

The Oregon Court rejected that content 1,1

The Court held:

In order to protect his interest in the collateral,
to redeem it if possible, to insure the commercial
reasonableness of the disposition and to protect any
excess or minimize any deficiency, the debtor must be
informed of what disposition the secured party intends
to make of the collateral. Without that basic
information, the debtor is not in a position to
protect his interests, and the purpose of the notice
provision of [U.C.C. §9-504(3)(1972)] has not been met.
This notice did not inform plaintiff of the intended
disposition of the collateral and was insufficient
to meet the requirements of the statute. Id. 617 P.2d
at 665, 30 U.C.C.Rep. at 400 (Emphasis added).
Likewise, the notice given to Vernon R. Erickson did not meet the
statutory requirement and was insufficient.

The notice did not state the

manner and method of the intended disposition.

In a footnote, the Oregon

Court in dicta stated that where a party who is not a dealer in the type of
equipment to be sold intends a private sale at a known price, then it would
not be unreasonable for the creditor to notify the debtor that the collateral
would be sold on a certain date at a certain price in order to allow the
debtor to protect his interests.

Id., Fn. 5.

Western Leasing knew the date

of the sale but did not render notice of the price to Vernon R. Erickson.
In a decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court, Citizens State Bank v.
Sparks, 202 Neb. 661, 276 N.l'/.2d 661, 26 II.CC.Rep. 5,qg (1979), that Court
held that notice which "did not identify the type of sale or the time after
which private sale would be made" did not constitute the notice requireJ
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by

the Uniform Commercial Code.
lhP

Id. 276 N.W.2d at 664, 26 U.C.C.Rep. at 592.

letter from the creditor in that case stated only that the car would be

repossessed and that the car would he sold and the proceeds applied to the
debt owing.

Although the notice in the case at bar did specify a date, the

date was inherently inisleading since one could conclude a public sale was taking
place on September 30, 1980.

The emphasis of the Nebraska Supreme Court was

that an obliger is to be notified of the type of disposition of repossessed
collateral.

Similarly, Western Leasing did not notify Vernon R. Erickson of

the manner or type of disposition of the collateral.
In Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Dynatron, Inc., _Conn.Supp._
A.2d

, 30 U.C.C.Rep. 770 (1980), the Court stated that the notice sent by

the creditor to the debtor did not specifically refer either to a public or
private sale.

The Court did note that the notice itself met all the require-

ments for a public sale notice but that the collateral was not sold at a
public sale.

The Court concluded that the notice was therefore "ambiguous,

misleading and confusing, since it was not made clear therein to [the debtor]
whether plaintiff intended a public or private sale."

30 U.C.C. Rep. at 775.

Likewise, Western Leasing's letter to Vernon R. Erickson was ambiguous and
misleading and did not indicate the type of sale which was to take place.
In Simmons Machinery Co., Inc. v. M & M Brokerage, Inc.,
So.2d

Ala.

, 16 ABR 138, 33 U.C.C.Rep 419 {1981), the Alabama Supreme Court

held that the notice requirement of the U.C.C. requires that the notice clearly
convey its purpose, including the type of sale which will be held.

The creditors

notice in this case stated that the dehtor had until November 29, 1976 to
satisfy the accrued inrlehtedness.

The notice further stated that "[a]fter
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this date, the drill will be eligible for resale."
426.

lrl. 31

11.c.C.Rep.

at

The Court stated that the notice was tentative as to the sale rlate an1

that it failed to identify the type of sale

would he performerl.

Western

Leasing's letter stated a date certain on which the sale would be performed.
The sale was not held on that date.

Moreover,

Leasing's letter did

not state the type or manner of sale to be held.
The sale actually performed by Western Leasing was more in the
nature of a public sale than a private sale.

Notice of a private sale may

not be given when one actually intends a public sale and disposes of
collateral by public sale.

In Associates Financial Services Co., Inc. v.

DiMarco, 383 A.2d 296, 23 U.C.C.Rep. 1394 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978), the creditor
gave notice according to the less onerous notice provisions for a private
sale and then sold the collateral at a public sale.- The Court held that the
creditor could not circumvent the public sale notice provisions by giving
notice of a private sale and then selling at a public sale.

Western Leasing

in this case claims to have given notice of a private sale but the collateral
was sold according to public bids in the nature of a public sale.

Consequent!

the notice which was given is once again shown to be unreasonable.
In an effort to prevent the circumvention of the public sale notice
by giving notice of private sale, an Illinois Appellate Court held in
Spillers v. First National Bank of Arenzville, 81 Ill .App.3d 190, 400 N.E.2d
1057, 28 U.C.C.Rep. 884 {1980), that it is the duty of a creditor to notify
the debtor of "all and every proposed private sale."
28 U.C.C.Rep. at 889.

Id. 400 N.E.2d at 1060,

The Court in that action construed che language of

U.C.C. §9-504(3)(1972) requiring that reasonable notification be
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of

"any private sale" to mean that the creditor is obliged to inform a debtor

,,f Pach and every private sale which is to be performed pursuant to the Code.
See also, Delay First National Bank v. Jacobson Appliance, 196 Neb. 398, 243
N.fl.2d 745, 19 U.C.C.Rep. 994 (1976); Hertz Leasing Corp. v. Dynatron, Inc.,
supra.
Finally, in Stewart v. Taylor Chevrolet, Inc. (In re Webb), 17
U.C.C.Rep. 627 (S.D. Ohio 1975), the creditor gave notice that the collateral
was to be sold at public sale.

However, the collateral was not sold on the

date so specified but was later sold at a private sale.
stances of that sale are analogous with the case at bar.
Court held that the sale was not commercially reasonable.

Thus, the circumThe Federal District
The Court found that

the subsequent private sale of the collateral after having given notice of a
public sale abrogated the notice requirements of U.C.C. §9-504(3) (1972).
The Court noted that:

"Proper notice is the key to the disposition of

o roperty by a creditor when he takes possession after default."
supra, 17 U.C.C.Rep. at 631.

Stewart,

A similar holding is appropriate in this case

where l'estern Leasing failed to comply with the statutory requirements of
nntice.
In conclusion, the letter purported to be a notice of sale was
insufficient to meet the statutory requirements of Utah Code Ann. §?OA-9-504
(3)(1953).

The letter failed to state the type of sale which was to be

performed and did not state the date after which the sale was to occur.
Therefore, the lower court erred in concluding that Western Leasing's notice
constituted reasonable notification sufficient to comply with Utah Code Ann.
§704-9-504(3)(1953).
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B.

The Alleged Letter of Notice
a Demand
Letter and NOT a Notice of Sale.

Western Leasiny's letter to Vernon R. Erickson which is P'irp,ir·te·I
to be the notice of sale, is only a demand letter.
discusses general provisions of the leases.

The first paraqraph

The seconrl

rliscusses

the default under which the leases have been accelerated anrl the amount
currently accrued and owing to Western Leasinq.

The third paragraph 'nakes

demand for payment of the full amount of the indebtedness under the lease.
The fourth paragraph is phrased in terms of if and then consequences of
various actions.

The final paragraph again speaks in terms of if and then

consequences stating if additional collection steps are required, Western
Leasing will ask for payment of attorneys fees and costs.
The nature of the letter is a demand letter.
Subject heading says:

The letter under the

"Western Leasing-BMG Corporation Leases'.

No mention

is made that it is a notice of intended sale or disposition of the collateral.
The fourth paragraph 1nentions the equipment rnight be solrl.

The terms of the

sale are tentative and ambiguous.
In Simmons Machinery Co., supra, the Court found that the letter
was more in the nature of a demand for payment since it was tentative in
nature on the matter of sale and did not identify the type of sale to take
place or the time when such sale might be made.

Similarly, the letter

purported to constitute notice of sale by Western Leasing was in the nature
of a demand letter.

It too was tentative as to the date of sale since no

time was specified and did not set forth the type of sale which would
place.

It follows that the letter sent to Vernon R. Erickson was ins11ffEien'

- l'l-

to satisfy the requi rernents of IJtah Code Ann. §70A-9-504(3) (1953), since it
fails to provide "reasonable notification" of the intended disposition of
tl1e collateral.
POINT I I I
WESTERN LEASING IS BARRED FROM OBTAINING A
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT
Sale of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner, and
reasonable notification of such a sale are prerequisites to obtaining a
deficiency judgment.
1979).

FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d R03 (Utah,

The failure to meet the burden of showing that reasonable notice was

given to the obligors and that the sale was conducted in a commercially
reasonable manner bars the creditor from obtaining a deficiency judgment.
Utah Bank & Trust v. Quinn, 622 P.2d 793 (Utah, 1980); Pioneer Dodge Center,
Inc. v. Glaubensklee, 649 P.2d 28 (Utah, 1982).

See also, Bell, The Golden

Rule of Collateral Disposition Under Article 9 of the U.C.C., 10 Utah Bar
Journal 37 (1982).

The result of Western Leasing's failure to sell the

repossessed collateral in a commercially reasonable manner bars a deficiency
judgment.

Consequently, the judgment against Vernon R. Erickson should be

set aside.
CONCLUSION
Western Leasing's sale of the collateral was not performed in a
cornmercially reasonable manner.

The equipment was not sold at a public sale

since there was no competitive bidding.

The equipment was not properly sold

at a private sale since it was not sold through regular, normal commercial
:hannels.

Leasinq did not sell
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equipment in a commercially

reasonable manner to obtain the hiqhest realization oossihle uonn thg sale
the collateral.

0r

Western Leasinq merely sold the collat<•ril as 'luicUy as

possible to an available purchaser without reqarrl to the fair rnarfet price.
The liquidated damages provisions in the leases qive '·lestern Leasinc
the benefit of its bargain.

Had the lessees not defaulted, Western Leasinq

would not have obtained the full benefit of its bargain until 1984.

They

should have waited to sell the collateral until they obtained a co1nmercially
reasonable price.

All parties would have benefited from a sale of the

collateral through regular co1mnercial channels over a period of tirne which
did not amount to a distress sale.
Western Leasing's letter to Vernon R. Erickson did not comply with
the statutory requirements.

The letter '..ias patently ambiguous.

did not state the manner and method of sale of the collateral.

The letter
Indeed, the

letter was in the nature of a demand letter and was not a notice of sale
sufficient to satisfy the Code requirements.

It fol lows that

sent

to Vernon R. Erickson was not proper and reasonable notification as required
by the Code.
The failure of Western Leasing to co1nply with the statutory
requirements of reasonable notification and commercial reasonableness in the
sale of collateral bars the deficiency judgment which was granted by
lower Court.

Appellant respectfully submits that the decision of

lower

Court should be reversed and the judgment against Appellant shoulrl be set
aside.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
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